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1 Introduction
Today’s labor markets are characterized by a large degree of flexibility.
Among a variety of aspects, labor market mobility contributes to this
flexibility (OECD (1997)). In recent times, a growing strand of literature
corroborates that a considerable fraction of workers are changing jobs at
the cost of wage cuts. In Germany, a large number of workers are shown
to be mobile toward lower wages. Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) refer
to establishment-to-establishment transitions during two successive years
and show that more than one in five individuals are mobile with wage cuts.
Jolivet et al. (2006) apply data from the European Community Household
Panel Survey to reveal that 36.3% of job-to-job transitions in Germany
are accompanied by wage cuts. The authors define job-to-job mobility as
transitions without noticeable unemployment spells of less than one month.
Transitions to lower wages are not a typical German phenomenon. In
their cross-country analysis, Jolivet et al. (2006) show that almost one in five
individuals is mobile to lower wages in Portugal and Belgium. The largest
shares of wage cuts are observed in Denmark, France, and Germany. In
these countries, more than 34% of mobile individuals suffer wage cuts in the
period of mobility. In line with this result, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
show that more than one in three workers changing jobs directly did so at
the cost of a wage cut.1 For the United States, Jolivet et al. (2006) indicate
that 23% of job-to-job transitions are to lower wages.2 Nosal and Rupert
(2007) utilize the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and show that about
two in five individuals (voluntarily) change to lower wages. The results of
these studies for different countries indicate that scientists should turn their
attention to the reasons for mobility with wage cuts.
This paper sets forth an analysis of the reasons for job-to-job mobility to
lower wages with a special focus on changes in different (non-pecuniary) job
characteristics after the transition. It utilizes the German Socio-Economic
1 Using French data, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) refer to direct mobility as job-to-job
mobility with a maximum intervening unemployment spell of 15 days.
2 Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the authors refer to job-to-job mobility
when intervening unemployment, if any, does not exceed three weeks.
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Panel (GSOEP in the following; see Wagner et al. (2007)), which includes
questions on the reasons for job termination at the previous employer and
surveys comparisons between both jobs. This is a major enhancement
to previous papers because it allows one to determine whether workers
voluntarily accept wage cuts in order to improve job-specific (non-wage)
amenities.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates briefly
the basic framework and the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
data set, main variables, and econometric models. I present the econometric
results for the impact of subjective improvements in different job-specific
characteristics on the decision to accept wage cuts in section 4. A conclusion
is presented in section 5.
2 Framework and Research Questions
Recent literature considers wage cuts a result of job termination. In Jolivet
(2009), workers are allowed to change jobs directly to lower wages because
their only alternative is non-employment. These transitions are referred to
as job reallocations and are also mentioned in other studies (e.g., Jolivet et al.
(2006)). Other theoretic approaches explain wage cuts as an investment
in future wage growth (Connolly and Gottschalk (2008), Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002)). It is also reasonable to change to a new employer offering
lower wages if the wage cut at the current employer had been larger (see, e.g.,
Shi (2009) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). Schneck (2010) empirically
suggests the prevalence of investments in future wage growth but also re-
vealed that a substantial fraction of workers are mobile to permanently lower
wages. Because workers are shown to accept lower wages on a permanent
basis, other determinants are hypothesized to affect mobility decisions. For
example, it is suggested that job-specific (non-wage) amenities affect the
job choice (Nosal and Rupert (2007)).
Economic and psychological literature, however, lack detailed informa-
tion about the reasons for accepting lower wages. The basic idea of this
paper proposes that differences in wages between two jobs might be bal-
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anced out by differences in (non-wage) job characteristics. Analogously to
Rosen (1974, 1987) one could hypothesize that jobs consist of bundles of
various characteristics with implicit, or hedonic, prices. Competent and
self-supporting individuals, however, know that they cannot always get
what they want, and that is the reason why they are expected to make
appropriate adjustments. More specifically, individuals are expected to
know that it is unlikely to find a better job with a higher wage, more flexible
work time arrangements, and more job security right at their front door. It
is important to analyze the extent of trade-off reasoning in the context of
labor market mobility because ”Trade-off reasoning should be so pervasive
and so well rehearsed as to be virtually automatic for the vast majority of
the [...] population” (Tetlock (2000), p. 239).
Here, I assume that workers only change jobs if the utility U of worker i
at employer j in time t exceeds the utility at the previous employer:3
Uijt > Ui,j−1,t−1 (1)
Workers are confronted with job offers which contain information on the
wage and a set of various job-specific amenities. Wage offers of employer j
are offered to worker i in t independently of the worker’s marginal willingness
to avoid disamenities or to pay for amenities. Utility maximization implies
that the worker changes employer if:
Uijt(wage,amenities)> Ui,j−1,t−1(wage,amenities) (2)
This paper concentrates on whether voluntary mobile workers accept a
decrease in wages in exchange of an improvement in amenities. For this
reason, the article mainly focuses on the theory of trade-off reasoning. The
exclusive concentration on voluntary quits in the paper is assumed to assure
that the drop in wages is compensated for by improvements in amenities.
wageijt−wagei,j−1,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
= U(amenitiesijt−amenitiesi,j−1,t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(3)
3 Mobility costs are ignored. In addition, this paper is only responsive to short-term
wage cuts which might pay off in the long-run.
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Pr(Wage Cutijt = 1) = Uijt(improvement in amenities︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
,S)
Pr(Wage Cutijt = 1) = Φ(β0 +β′improvement in amenitiesijt+ δ′Sijt)
(4)
The hypothesis about trade-off reasoning is summarized in Equation (3).
Worker i balances out improvements in job-specific amenities between
two jobs and the wage decline when changing employer in period t. The
probability to accept wage cuts, then, is expected to be positively affected
by certain job-specific amenities. S summarizes further determinants which
might affect the decision to accept lower wages. I tested the hypothesis by
application of the probability model in which Φ is the cumulative density
function of the standard normal distribution. Evidence in favor of trade-off
reasoning in mobility decisions is provided in case of a positive estimate for
β. The following strategy to estimate the willingness to pay for amenities
(β) exploits the preferences about wages and amenities that are revealed
when workers change jobs voluntarily.4 Precisely, utility-maximizing workers
only change employers if job-specific amenities compensate for their loss in
wages. In the following, I described the effects of the job-specific amenities,
namely, ’flexible work schedules’, ’subjective job security against job loss’,
’promotion possibilities’, and ’strain’ on the probability to accept a wage
cut.
The paper addresses whether workers trade off improvements in strain
and wages. Strain is shown to negatively affect individual satisfaction (see,
e.g., Loscocco and Spitze (1990)). Cornelißen (2009) finds a negative effect
4 Note that selection of workers might bias the estimates. In regression analysis, biased
estimates are obtained when unobserved determinants of the outcome and unobserved
determinants of selection into the the sample are correlated. The correlation between
unobservables, however, cannot be directly evaluated. I expect that my estimates rather
provide an upper bound for the acceptance for wage cuts since the workers in my sample
are indeed compensated for the loss in wages by amenities. Note that some workers might
also be compensated for the improvement in job-specific amenities by sacrificing (large)
wage markups.
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of hard manual labor and stress (which are dimensions of job strain) on
job satisfaction. According to Mobley (1977), dissatisfaction with a job is
translated into thoughts of leaving the employer, evaluation of alternatives,
and mobility because starting a new job is expected to result in a higher
satisfaction. In fact, Judge (1993) shows that dissatisfied workers are more
likely to quit than other individuals. Literature, however, lacks information
on whether mobile individuals are willing to accept wage cuts in order to
leave the dissatisfying job. This paper assesses whether individuals who
expect decreasing strain when changing jobs are willing to accept lower
wages. Analogous argumentation is expected to hold for improved job
security by wage cuts because Cornelißen (2009) shows that satisfaction
with the job is negatively affected by worries about (perceived) job security.
Based on the question of Altonji and Paxson (1988) on whether workers
are willing to sacrifice wage gains for better working hours when quitting
a job, I ask whether workers are even willing to accept wage cuts for an
improvement of work time regulations. The main reason for a special
focus on the latter hypothesis is that individuals face a trade-off between
time constraints and monetary rewards. To be more precise, if the current
employer offers few possibilities for flexible leisure, then, working at a new
employer with more flexible working schedules might be preferred despite
lower wages. In other words, workers know that it is very problematic
(almost impossible) to achieve the highest flexibility without paying a price
for it.
In addition, the possibilities for promotions at the new employer might
affect the decision to accept wage cuts. Pfeifer and Schneck (2010) show
that workers who change to higher relative wage positions compared to
the previous establishment have, on average, a lower probability to change
to lower wages. Workers who change to lower relative wage positions, in
turn, likely suffer more wage cuts. For this reason, the authors do not
present evidence in favor of trade-off reasoning in relative wage positions
and wages. However, it is suggested that workers who change with wage
cuts to a lower relative wage position might benefit from better chances for
future promotions within the new firm. For this reason, it is argued that
workers might pay for future promotion opportunities by wage cuts.
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Usually workers evaluate these job-specific amenities before the tran-
sition. The data, in turn, refers to realized transitions with completed
trade-off reasoning (a more detailed description of the data follows in the
next section). For this reason, individual answers on the questions about
subjective improvements in the new job might involve problems regarding
cognitive dissonance reduction theory (Festinger (1957)). This particu-
lar theory describes that unpleasant arousal drives people to resolve the
cognitive inconsistency. In other words, if two cognitions are discrepant,
individuals simply change one to make it consistent with the other. Here,
workers might act contrary to their attitude because of mobility to lower
wages. As a consequence, these workers adjust their cognition about the
job in a positive way to balance out this effect. In the underlying case,
workers might change their attitude toward the new job in a positive way
as a consequence from the decision to be mobile to lower wages. As a
consequence, workers who accept wage cuts report to be more satisfied with
the new job compared to workers changing without wage cuts. If this is
true, the estimated coefficients on subjective comparisons (improvements)
between the previous and the current job would be upwardly biased. A
direct test of this possible critique cannot be conducted by application of
the GSOEP.
3 Data and Procedure
3.1 Data
This study utilizes the GSOEP household survey to examine the impact
of job-specific amenities on the probability of being mobile with wage cuts.
The main advantage of this data set stems from the fact that it includes
subjective comparisons between the previous and current jobs. I restricted
the analysis to German citizens who are employed full-time in two successive
years during the period 1994–2007. The sample considers private sector
employees with permanent contracts aged between 20 and 60 years. The
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lower age boundary is chosen because the school degrees are usually achieved
before 20 years of age.5
The data include annual information on the last monthly gross wage
of individual i in period t (measured in Euros) which is applied in the
consecutive analysis. I apply the consumer price index provided by the
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (annual averages, with year 2005 =
100) to deflate the wages. In addition, the questionnaire asks the ”How
many hours are stipulated in your contract (excluding overtime)?” The
corresponding information is utilized to calculate the hourly wage of indi-
viduals. The hourly wage (wijt) as well as the real hourly wage (wrealijt ) of
individual i in period t at employer j are defined as follows:
wijt =
monthly wageijt
4.33∗ contractual weekly working timeijt
wrealijt =
deflated monthly wageijt
4.33∗ contractual weekly working timeijt
(5)
Note that the GSOEP also includes information on overtime or the actual
hours worked. I decided to concentrate on the contractual working hours
because this measure is less affected by (cyclical or employer-specific) fluc-
tuations. As the data are set up as a panel, information about the wage in
the previous year is utilized to determine wage cuts and wage improvements.
To examine the probability of wage cuts, a binary variable is constructed to
illustrate whether individuals are mobile to lower wages or not:6
Wage Cutijt =
{
1 mobility to lower wages (wit−wi,j−1,t−1 < 0)
0 mobility to higher wages (wit−wi,j−1,t−1 ≥ 0)
Wage Cutrealijt =
{
1 mobility to lower wages (wrealit −wreali,j−1,t−1 < 0)
0 mobility to higher wages (wrealit −wreali,j−1,t−1 ≥ 0)
(6)
5 I consider the years of education which is based on information provided by the
GSOEP.
6 Wage information of the year 1993 is utilized to calculate the wage growth of mobile
workers in 1994. I drop reported wages of zero.
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In order to account for the individual trade-off reasoning appropriately, the
analysis attempts to identify voluntary mobility, which is defined as an
unconstrained decision of the individual. The underlying GSOEP includes
detailed retrospective information about labor mobility. Each year, the
questionnaire asks whether a new job was started at a new employer.7
Individuals who reported an employer change, then, are asked whether they
resigned on their own initiative. In the subsequent analysis, only those
reporting a resignation on their own initiative are considered. In addition,
I focus on mobile workers who changed employer within one month. This
criterion was instituted to meet the definition of job-to-job mobility where
individuals have to be mobile within one month (Jolivet et al. (2006),
Royalty (1998)). In sum, 800 voluntary employer-to-employer transitions of
670 individuals who quit their jobs up to four times are considered. Note
that the sample size of the entire GSOEP data is considerably reduced by
implementation of the restrictions but the sample size is comparable to the
one reported in Villanueva (2007).
A diversity of subjective improvements of different job characteristics are
surveyed in the data. More specifically, the data set includes information
about comparisons between the previous and current jobs if individuals
reported a job change. The corresponding question read as follows: ”How
would you judge your present position compared to your last one? In what
ways has it improved, stayed the same, or worsened?” This particular
question considers the following characteristics:
1. wages
2. job type
3. chances for promotion
7 The analysis excludes workers starting their first job or have a new job after a
break. Individuals who report a job change within a firm and individuals who become
self-employed are also not subject of the underlying analysis. The paper, hence, focuses
on transitions between different employers. Unique information about this special pattern
is available from 1994 onwards.
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4. work load (strain)
5. length of commute to and from work
6. work schedule regulations (work time)
7. fringe benefits
8. security against job loss8
In the subsequent analysis, the answers to the question on strain, job security,
commuting, work time, and promotions are applied to analyze the impact
of trade-off reasoning on the decision to be mobile to lower wages. Another
question asks whether the individual uses his or her knowledge and skills
more, the same, or less than in the previous job. This variable is to describe
whether the worker’s skills meet the required ones in the new job and can
be interpreted as a match quality indicator. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics and reveals that only very few transitions (9.5%) are accompanied
by a subjective worsening of wages. In the following, the paper concentrates
on dummy variables which describe improvements or worsenings of the
subjective comparisons. The corresponding frequencies of the subjective
comparisons are shown in Table A1 while means and standard deviations
are presented in Table A2.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on wage changes induced by voluntary
job-to-job mobility. Application of nominal wages reveals that 24.38%
transitions are executed to lower wages. These numbers are comparable
to the ones reported in Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007). For real wages,
however, the results are closer to the ones reported in Jolivet et al. (2006),
where about one in three transitions are to lower wages. On average, all
8 The questions and potential answer categories differ slightly over the years. No
information is available in the 2008 wave of the GSOEP. Regarding fringe benefits,
the German questionnaire refers to ”betriebliche Sozialleistungen” while the English
questionnaire refers to ”benefits”.
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directly mobile workers generate a wage markup of about 15.40% (nominal)
and 13.68% (real), respectively. This average wage premium for mobility is
another reason for the conventional hypothesis that employer-to-employer
mobility is voluntary.
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics on wage changes after mobility
share of wage 10% mean 90% Number of
cuts percentile percentile observations
wijt
wi,j−1,t−1 0.2438 0.8756 1.1540 1.4463 800
(0.4296) (0.3440)
0.0000 1.0163 1.2488 1.5484 605
(—) (0.3380)
1.0000 0.6857 0.8599 0.9811 195
(—) (0.1296)
wrealijt
wreali,j−1,t−1
0.3175 0.8635 1.1368 1.4246 800
(0.4658) (0.3381)
0.0000 1.0309 1.2563 1.5498 546
(—) (0.3393)
1.0000 0.7164 0.8801 0.9910 254
(—) (0.1267)
subjective worsening 0.0950 800
in wages (0.2934)
Standard deviations in parentheses
The share of workers who are mobile with wage markups, however, is
very different from the workers who are mobile to lower wages. The average
wage markup amounts to 24.88% (nominal) and 25.63% (real) for upwardly
mobile individuals. Downwardly mobile workers, in turn, suffer an average
wage cut of more than 10%. The wage markups and wage cuts presented
here are comparable to the ones presented in Fitzenberger and Garloff
(2007). Note that the subjective perception of declines (worsenings) in
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wages is, by far, smaller than the number of wage cuts. Precisely, 9.50% of
transitions are accompanied by subjective wage cuts while more than two in
five transitions are to lower hourly wages. This suggests that the disutility
introduced by monetary losses might be offset by other dimensions of the
current job which directly adverts to trade-off reasoning in job mobility.
Figure 1 presents the share of wage cuts by the categories of subjective
comparison of wages between two jobs. As expected, the share of workers
with realized wage cuts increases with increasing subjective worsenings
about the wage change. In other words, 68.42% (nominal) and 76.32%
(real) of individuals who report subjective worsenings in wages indeed suffer
wage cuts, whereas only 13.63% and 21.31% of individuals who report a
subjective improvement in wages actually experience wage cuts. Figure 2
shows that the share of mobility with wage cuts within a certain period
are rather unaffected by the business cycle. To be more precise, the period
between 1996 and 2006 was especially characterized by a relatively stable
share of transition to lower wages. Note that this does not imply that
mobility is equally common across the different phases of the business cycle
(see footnote 11). In sum, the descriptive statistics show that mobility to
lower wages is frequent across different phases of the business cycle, which
accentuates the importance of an analysis of the reasons for the acceptance
of lower wages.
www.economics-ejournal.org 11
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
Figure 1 : Share of wage cuts by subjective cognition about wage change
Number of observations: Nimproved = 521, Nstayed the same = 203,
Nworsened = 76
Figure 2 : Share of wage cuts by year
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3.3 Methods and Procedure
The research question on whether workers accept wage cuts in exchange for
improvements in job amenities can directly be addressed in a probit model
because the dependent variable on whether a wage cut was accepted or not
is binary by construction. Literature recommends the analysis of binary
dependent variables by application of binary choice models. Here, a probit
model that relates to Equation (4) was utilized. Equation (7) shows the
applied probit model, where Xijt stands for dummy variables which describe
improvements or worsenings between the previous and the current jobs,
whereas Sijt describes sociodemographic information and other determinants
affecting mobility to lower wages. The corresponding descriptive statistics
are presented in Table A2.
Pr(Wage Cutijt = 1) = Φ(α+β′Xijt+ δ′Sijt) (7)
Individual characteristics include gender, age, education (in years), and
whether or not individuals live with a partner. Regional mobility is included
in the analysis because Yankow (2003) shows that changing locale affects
wages. More specifically, I accounted for the federal state (Bundesland) in
which an individual is working. If a worker changes to a job in a different
federal state compared to the previous one, the corresponding dummy
variable for regional mobility equals one. In addition, transitions from
blue-collar to white-collar jobs are accounted for by a dummy variable. I
also account for the economic environment in different years. Precisely, I
include the growth of unemployment rate into the analysis.9 The number of
individual mobility describes the calculated number of quits on own initiative
between 1985 and the year of the interview. Note that the minimum is
one because the current quit is included.10 In a next step, the marginal
9 I apply the unemployment rate provided by the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Table 090). Unemployment growth is defined as
unempt−unempt−1.
10Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables which are included in
the subsequent multivariate analysis. Workers who voluntarily change jobs are, on average,
about 35 years old. This finding can be interpreted with the hypothesis that middle-aged
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willingness to pay for different amenities is estimated via application of OLS
regression. The dependent variable describes the wage change while the
set of control variables is identical to the one in the probit model discussed
previously.
w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
= a+ b′Xijt+d′Sijt+uijt (8)
Finally, the corner solution (tobit) estimation approach is applied which com-
bines aspects of the binomial probit for the distinction of w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
≥ 1 and
w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
< 1 and the regression model for E[ w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
|Xijt,Sijt, w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
<
1].
w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
∗
= e+f ′Xijt+g′Sijt+vijt (9)
workers assess their own aspiration levels best (Clark et al. (1996)). More than two in
three mobile individuals are renters. The average education in years is between 12 and
13 years. Regional mobility plays a minor role by simple consideration of its frequency,
since workers are shown to leave their federal state for a new job rarely. Only 4.75%
of individuals perform cross-border transitions between federal states in Germany. A
minority of mobile individuals life together with a partner (21.25%). About one in 20
transitions are from a blue-collar job to a white-collar job. It is also necessary to account
for the workforce in the previous and the current firm (see, e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989)).
13.25% of individuals are leaving a firm with more than 2,000 employees while 17.13%
of mobile workers are employed at a new firm with more than 2,000 employees. The
following cross-table illustrates the number of observations by firm-size categories.
Number of observations by firm-size
Dummy variable for Dummy variable for workforcei,j,t > 2,000
workforcei,j−1,t−1 > 2,000 0 1 Total
0 604 90 694
1 59 47 106
Total 663 137 800
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w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
=

w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
∗
if w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
< 1
0 if w
(real)
ijt
w
(real)
i,j−1,t−1
≥ 1
(10)
Estimation of the corner solution model, then, allows to compute the
marginal willingness to pay for different amenities by wage cuts, given that
the individual changes to lower wages.11 As the data are set up as a panel, I
am able to make effort to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. All
the tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no individual heterogeneity.12
Note that the analysis of this particular trade-off reasoning might be
characterized by simultaneity in the acceptance of wage cuts and improve-
ments in the new job. This problem might introduce problems regarding
endogeneity. Note that one single endogenous regressor might seriously
affect the results. One way to deal with this type of problem is to utilize
a two-stage least square estimator, where I need to identify instrument
variables. However, it is hard to find any variable which is partially corre-
lated with subjective improvements between two jobs and exogenous in the
decision to accept wage cuts. Given any simultaneity in trade-off reasoning,
the following coefficients do not have a causal interpretation.
11The tobit approach can be viewed as a special case of the so-called Heckman sample
selection model (Heckman (1979)) when the selection equation and the regression equation
are identical. One reason to refer to the tobit model is that it is problematic to define a
reasonable selection equation because of a lack of literature on the acceptance of wage
cuts in voluntary mobility decisions.
12Precisely, different tests were conducted for the entire sample. A likelihood-ratio test
was conducted in order to assess whether individual random-effects were evident in the
probit model which explains whether a wage cut was accepted or not. The Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan (1980)) was applied to test for unobserved
individual heterogeneity in the linear model on the wage change. Finally, a likelihood-ratio
test was applied for the tobit model. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in all cases.
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3.4 Specification
This section concentrates on the choice of specification. As mentioned
above, the data include a large set of dummy variables for subjective
comparisons which can be included in Xijt. Note that some of the dummy
variables of subjective comparisons between jobs are highly correlated. Table
A3 presents the correlation coefficients where Spearman’s correlation and
Tetrachoric correlations for binary variables are applied. Obvious problems
regarding multicollinearity, however, are not revealed because of a maximum
correlation coefficient of 0.6501 for a worsening in fringe benefits and a
worsening in job security. Note that I abstract from Tetrachoric correlations
of -1.000 between improvements and worsenings in job-specific amenities
which are plausible because an improvement can never be associated of the
same subjective comparison measure. Regarding the choice of specification,
the match-specific component (comparison of use of skills) is included in
all specifications because of its importance on the wage determination
in economic literature. As discussed in the framework above, individual
preferences about trade-off reasoning are also revealed when comparing
flexible work schedules, strain, promotion chances, and perceived job security
between the previous job and the current job. For this reason, these
determinants are subject to the first (”preferred”) specification.
In a further step, I extended the preferred specification by inclusion
of dummy variables for subjective improvements and worsenings of fringe
benefits, of commuting, and of the general job type. This specification,
then, might be referred to as the full specification because all subjective
comparisons (with exception of the subjective comparison of wages) are
considered. Please note that subjective perceptions about the general job
type and the use of skills are significantly correlated.13 This suggests that
both variables might describe the subjective change in the match quality
when comparing the current job to the previous job. Fringe benefits might be
13The corresponding Tetrachoric correlation equals 0.6173 for an improvement in the
general job type and and better use of skills and is the third highest correlation coefficient
in Table A3. For worse jobs in general and less use of skills, the correlation is similar
(0.6066) and significant.
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monetary amenities which are paid by the firm. For this reason, this measure
might reflect some redeployment of wages rather than trade-off reasoning.
However, a serious concern emerges in case of endogeneity in the decision
to accept wage cuts and the change in commuting expenses. As mentioned
above, this pattern seriously might affect the results. Nevertheless, the full
specification is expected to provide a valuable robustness check of the results
obtained by the preferred specification.
In a next step, factor analysis is utilized in order to reduce the dimension
from the multitude of dummy variables of subjective comparisons to a
lower number of factors. Precisely, principal component factor analysis with
orthogonal varimax rotation is conducted. The obtained factors are a set
of independent and mutually orthogonal linear combinations of all of the
subjective comparisons between the jobs. Because the choice of the number
of factors is complex, one can rely on information criteria or one can search
for solutions which are to be interpreted in an economically meaningful way.
The Bayesian information criterion suggests considering six factors wherein
the factor loadings can be meaningfully interpreted. The corresponding
results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 : Factor analysis with six factors
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Uniqueness
Interpretation of job job
the factor working amenities match match amenities
conditions improved improved commuting worsened worsened
Strain ↓ 0.7224 0.0181 0.0862 0.0226 0.0176 0.0932 0.4609
Strain ↑ -0.6747 0.0571 0.2635 -0.0341 0.3162 -0.0612 0.3671
Work time ↓ 0.6259 -0.1730 0.2254 0.1308 0.3259 0.0014 0.4042
Work time ↑ -0.5616 0.4256 0.1224 -0.1563 0.0467 0.1743 0.4315
Fringe benefits ↑ -0.1447 0.7672 0.0955 0.0173 0.0550 0.0103 0.3780
Job security ↑ -0.0057 0.7061 0.1845 -0.0010 0.0774 -0.0601 0.4578
General job ↑ -0.1250 0.0378 0.7325 -0.0086 -0.1662 0.0269 0.4179
Use of skills ↑ 0.0808 0.1743 0.6448 0.0061 -0.4248 0.0557 0.3638
Promotion chances ↑ 0.0718 0.1430 0.6134 0.0895 0.1598 -0.4008 0.4040
Commuting ↑ -0.0590 0.0495 0.0760 -0.8640 0.0749 0.0420 0.2345
Commuting ↓ 0.0506 0.0533 0.1102 0.8457 0.0553 0.0812 0.2576
Use of skills ↓ -0.1225 0.0290 -0.1259 -0.0536 0.7662 0.0595 0.3748
General job ↓ 0.2454 0.2133 -0.2175 0.0325 0.5831 0.2444 0.4462
Promotion chances ↓ 0.0350 0.1279 -0.1654 0.0354 0.0489 0.7731 0.3537
Job security ↓ -0.0256 -0.3762 0.1573 0.0809 0.1791 0.5987 0.4359
Fringe benefits ↓ 0.2331 -0.4429 0.2563 -0.0766 0.1395 0.4473 0.4584
Method: principal component factors with orthogonal varimax rotation.
Number of observations: 800.
↑ describes improvements, ↓ refers to subjective worsenings.
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Table 2 presents the factor loadings which are used for interpretation of
the six factors, where the bold numbers describe the highest loadings for
the different factors. One can learn from the table that factor 1 is highly
affected by subjective comparisons in strain and work time regulations.
For this reason, these variables are used to assign the label to factor 1
because workload and work schedules are dimensions of job-specific working
conditions. Analogously, factor 2 can be interpreted as an improvement in
’job amenities’, as fringe benefits and the perceived job security against job
loss exhibit the highest factor loadings. Note that, for example, the factor
loadings for an improvement in work time also loads high on the factor two.
For this reason, a more flexible work schedule is suggested to affect factor 2
as well but is not directly included in the following interpretation of this
particular factor. The remaining factors are defined in a similar way. The
next step calculates the factor scores as proposed by Thomson (1951) which
are applied in the last specification. Workers who report improvements in
strain and work time are likely to have a negative factor score for ’working
condition’, whereas workers who change to jobs with worse strain and worse
work schedules are more likely to be associated with positive scores for
factor 1. Workers who report an improvement in commuting never obtain a
positive factor score for the factor ’commuting’, whereas workers reporting
a worsening never obtain a negative value. Interpretation of the remaining
factors is straightforward. Note that the determination of a set of factors
allows a reduction in the dimensionality of the analysis but it can also hide
what is going on at the disaggregated level. Therefore, inclusion of the factor
scores into the estimation framework should only be viewed as a further
robustness check.14
In sum, the analysis concentrates on three different sets of variables
included in Xijt. The first specification refers to the variables mentioned in
the framework. Precisely, subjective comparisons of the use of skills, flexible
work schedules, strain, commuting, promotion chances, and perceived job
security are subject to the first specification. The second specification
14The following table shows the factor scores which have a mean close to zero and a
standard deviation of one.
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additionally accounts for comparisons in fringe benefits and the general job
type. The set of variables in third specification contains the factor scores
which are described above.
4 Results
This section presents the results of the multivariate analysis. At first, I
accounted for the specifications including the dummy variables for subjective
comparisons between jobs. Table 3 presents the results for the probit esti-
mation framework on whether workers accepted a wage cut when changing
jobs. Note that the endogenous variable varies over specifications. Precisely,
specifications (1) and (2) explain mobility to lower wages when accounting
for gross wages, specifications (3) and (4) correspond to deflated gross wage
cuts, and specifications (5) and (6) present the probit estimates for the
subjective decline in wages. The link test for the corresponding probit
models shows that the following specifications are satisfactory because yˆ2 is
insignificant in all the test equations (see Ramsey (1969) for a comparable
test).
Regarding the above hypothesis of trade-off reasoning between subjective
improvements in amenities and mobility decisions to lower wages, different
specifications in Table 3 provide distinct insights. One can learn from
specification (1) that individuals pay for an improvement in strain by
lower wages. The coefficient is significant and positive, which implies
that an improvement in strain compared to the previous job increases the
Descriptive statistics: Factor scores
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Factor score 1 1.39e-09 1 -2.314253 2.998188
Factor score 2 6.73e-10 1 -2.629714 3.765187
Factor score 3 7.42e-11 1 -1.978934 2.801363
Factor score 4 3.31e-10 1 -1.594935 1.68852
Factor score 5 -1.41e-09 1 -1.771901 4.142451
Factor score 6 -1.38e-10 1 -1.640562 5.140013
Number of observations: 800.
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probability for voluntary mobility to lower wages. The estimated coefficient
in specification (1) equals 0.0650, which can be interpreted in that an
improvement in strain increases the probability for mobility to lower wages
by 0.0650 percentage points. As a result, trade-off reasoning is evident.
The effect is relatively robust to the inclusion of the remaining dummy
variables for subjective comparisons between jobs included in the data (see
specification (2)). The subjective evaluation of promotion opportunities
also have sizable impact by considering the size as well as significance of
the coefficients. Workers changing to a job with subjectively improved
opportunities to climb up the hierarchy are less likely to accept wage cuts,
whereas workers who change to worse future career prospects are more likely
to suffer earnings losses. This result contradicts the ones obtained by Pfeifer
and Schneck (2010), who report that a change in relative wage positions is
positively correlated to a change in wages. Accordingly, transitions to lower
relative wage positions which, in turn, increase future career prospects are
accompanied by lower wages. The results obtained here, however, suggest
that workers who change to jobs with better promotion opportunities are
less likely to change to lower wages. The differences might stem from the
definition of the variables in both studies: This study utilizes subjective
comparisons between jobs which can be evaluated in a completely different
manner when compared to an objective measure (the change in the relative
wage position) as utilized in Pfeifer and Schneck (2010). The results for
mobility to lower wages are basically comparable when deflated wages are
considered. Specifications (5) and (6) in Table 3 show that subjective
improvements in strain are also paid for by perceived wage cuts whereas the
coefficients are basically comparable to the ones presented in specifications (1)
and (2). This result reveals that trade-off reasoning between improvements
in strain and wages is evident.
Note that some of the coefficients for the subjective wage cut contradict
the ones obtained for the objective measures for wage cuts. An interpretation
for the different signs of the coefficient for a worsening in strain across
specifications is that workers who are less satisfied with the current job
have a higher probability to feel to be subjectively worse off in wages. A
somewhat surprising result is that the match indicator variable does not
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contribute any significant effect on the probability to accept wage cuts.
Individuals, however, are less likely to suffer wage cuts when better use of
skills is achieved in the new job compared to the previous one. For less
use of skills, negative effects are found in specifications (1) to (4), while
positive effects are revealed in specifications (5) and (6). An explanation for
this result might be that workers who are not able to use all of their skills
might feel bored, which possibly introduces dissatisfaction with wages or
perceptions of earnings losses. The negative coefficients in specifications (1)
to (4) are hardly to explain. It might be hypothesized that workers change
to jobs where they are not able to use all of their skills, but instead apply
one very special and highly paid skill. Thus, especially for highly qualified
specialists, less use of skills also might reduce the probability of wage cuts.
The effect of less security against a job loss is not robust across spec-
ifications. Interpretation, thus, is hardly to justify. Table 3 shows that
improvements in commuting are likely to increase the probability of wage
cuts whereas this effect is only statistically significant in specification (2).
But the size of the coefficients advert to economic significance and, thus,
reveal trade-off reasoning. The effect of a worsening in commuting expenses
is not robust across specifications. More fringe benefits in the current job
compared to the previous one significantly decrease the probability that
workers suffer wage cuts. Note that, however, fringe benefits can also be in-
cluded in the monthly payments, and thus, might be interpreted as monetary
job-specific amenities. Workers who change to less fringe benefits perceive
significant wage losses. This might be explained by habit-persistence, where
workers get used to different amenities and react with strong negative per-
ceptions in case amenities disappear. For the growth in the unemployment
rate, I do not find any significant impact that confirms the considerations
above. Cyclical fluctuations only have low impact on the acceptance of
voluntary wage cuts.
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Table 3 : Probit model on whether workers accepted a wage cut
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables mobility to lower wages mobility to lower wagesreal subjective perception of
wage loss
Strain improved 0.0650* 0.0702* 0.0921** 0.0991** 0.0625** 0.0733***
(0.0373) (0.0375) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0245) (0.0240)
Strain worsened -0.0310 -0.0312 -0.0601 -0.0624 0.0209 0.0132
(0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0468) (0.0466) (0.0312) (0.0262)
Work time improved -0.0150 -0.0102 -0.0598 -0.0514 0.0206 0.0341
(0.0341) (0.0365) (0.0374) (0.0398) (0.0212) (0.0210)
Work time worsened 0.0201 0.0251 0.0289 0.0252 0.0300 0.00716
(0.0510) (0.0534) (0.0541) (0.0563) (0.0353) (0.0267)
Security against job loss improved 0.0270 0.0489 0.0211 0.0455 -0.00441 0.0138
(0.0350) (0.0377) (0.0384) (0.0409) (0.0194) (0.0186)
Security against job loss worsened 0.0566 0.0535 -0.0163 -0.0398 0.0121 -0.0281
(0.0651) (0.0701) (0.0647) (0.0671) (0.0345) (0.0202)
Use of skills improved -0.0351 -0.0233 -0.0386 -0.0341 -0.0167 -0.0120
(0.0336) (0.0357) (0.0372) (0.0393) (0.0183) (0.0172)
Use of skills worsened -0.0426 -0.0476 -0.0365 -0.0419 0.00217 0.00150
(0.0451) (0.0455) (0.0518) (0.0521) (0.0244) (0.0228)
Chances for promotion improved -0.0781** -0.0700** -0.0729** -0.0658* -0.0850*** -0.0751***
(0.0322) (0.0327) (0.0362) (0.0369) (0.0190) (0.0174)
Chances for promotion worsened 0.194*** 0.199** 0.252*** 0.254*** 0.163*** 0.141**
(0.0754) (0.0775) (0.0770) (0.0777) (0.0603) (0.0582)
Commuting improved 0.0659* 0.0563 0.0101
(0.0385) (0.0422) (0.0200)
Commuting worsened -0.00415 0.00282 0.0128
(0.0389) (0.0420) (0.0212)
Fringe benefits improved -0.0591* -0.0688* -0.0402**
(0.0354) (0.0402) (0.0169)
Fringe benefits worsened -0.000826 0.0490 0.156***
(0.0546) (0.0624) (0.0530)
Job improved -0.0322 -0.0142 -0.0202
(0.0354) (0.0388) (0.0178)
Job worsened 0.0209 0.0165 -0.00512
(0.0872) (0.0945) (0.0349)
Homeowner 0.0554* 0.0626* 0.0380 0.0437 0.0104 0.0162
(0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0363) (0.0365) (0.0197) (0.0186)
Number of previous individual mobility -0.00117 -0.00318 0.0134 0.0124 0.00177 0.00265
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.00873) (0.00773)
Age 0.0339** 0.0352** 0.00842 0.0112 0.00872 0.0107
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.00803) (0.00719)
Age2 -0.000344* -0.000358* -1.65e-05 -4.96e-05 -8.35e-05 -0.000115
(0.000203) (0.000203) (0.000220) (0.000220) (0.000104) (9.43e-05)
Education in years -0.0174*** -0.0188*** -0.0100 -0.0114 -0.00484 -0.00547
(0.00672) (0.00660) (0.00732) (0.00731) (0.00387) (0.00352)
Bluecollar to whitecollar transition 0.00507 0.00814 -0.0207 -0.0223 0.0259 0.0307
(0.0649) (0.0661) (0.0705) (0.0715) (0.0410) (0.0390)
Male -0.00945 -0.00172 -0.0289 -0.0257 -0.0114 -0.0133
(0.0340) (0.0335) (0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0182) (0.0164)
Partner 0.0118 0.0142 0.00971 0.0142 0.0226 0.0211
(0.0396) (0.0400) (0.0433) (0.0440) (0.0260) (0.0234)
Firm more than 2,000 workers 0.0329 0.0516 0.0433 0.0667 -0.0145 -0.00529
(0.0433) (0.0451) (0.0468) (0.0486) (0.0219) (0.0213)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers -0.0170 -0.0226 0.00122 -0.00934 0.0631* 0.0413
(0.0464) (0.0455) (0.0524) (0.0517) (0.0356) (0.0295)
Regional mobility -0.0603 -0.0748 -0.111 -0.128* 0.00281 -0.0169
(0.0663) (0.0624) (0.0724) (0.0699) (0.0430) (0.0303)
Growth in unemployment rate 0.0174 0.0189 0.00139 0.00409 -0.00503 -0.00195
(0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0107) (0.00928)
Number of observations 800
Pseudo R2 0.0698 0.0784 0.0519 0.0585 0.144 0.1939
Predicted Pr(y = 1 |x¯) 0.2276 0.2253 0.3093 0.3080 0.0663 0.0557
Marginal effects at x¯ are presented.
All specifications are satisfactory by consideration of the link test because yˆ2 is insignificant in all test equations.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Before turning the focus on the absolute and relative wage change, the
six factors obtained via factor analysis described above are applied to check
the robustness of the results. Table 4 shows that a better match quality
significantly reduces the probability of the acceptance of earnings losses in
all specifications. This might be explained by economic literature where
the match quality is a main factor of wage determination. A worsening in
job amenities is not suggested to be compensated for by higher wages. In
fact, the reverse is true because individuals are significantly more likely to
suffer lower wages at the new employer compared to the previous one. An
interesting result is that the factors ’working conditions’ and ’improved job
amenities’ significantly affect the subjective perception of wage cuts while
insignificantly affecting the probability of an objective wage cut. The size
of the coefficients, however, is comparable across specifications. It seems
plausible that workers with improved job amenities are significantly less
likely to perceive worsenings in wages because of general satisfaction with the
job which also might result in more satisfaction with wages. Remember that
it is not straightforward to interpret the factor score for working conditions
because it includes subjective worsenings and improvements of strain and
work time regulations. For this reason, I omit interpretation of this factor.
In sum, Tables 3 and 4 reveal that workers accept lower wages for
improved strain. The remaining coefficients are, to the largest extent,
imprecisely measured by consideration of the standard errors or are not
consistent with the hypothesis of trade-off reasoning in mobility decisions.
Promotion opportunities are shown to have a robust and highly significant
effect on the probability of mobility to lower wages. The estimates, however,
reveal no evidence in favor of trade-off reasoning as hypothesized above. The
results, furthermore, contradict the ones presented in Pfeifer and Schneck
(2010), which might be reasoned by different definitions of the measures for
future career prospects. Pfeifer and Schneck (2010) use an objective measure
for the change in promotion opportunities, whereas this study applies a
subjective measure which depends on individual perceptions. Evidence on
the basis of the factor scores (which potentially hide the mechanisms on the
less aggregated level) do not support the hypothesis of trade-off reasoning
between wages and job amenities in mobility decisions as well. In fact,
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Table 4 : Probit model on whether workers accepted a wage cut (factor scores)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables subjective per-
mobility to mobility to ception of
lower wages lower wagesreal wage loss
Scores for factor 1 -0.0180 -0.0198 -0.0165*
(working conditions) (0.0149) (0.0168) (0.00978)
Scores for factor 2 -0.0121 -0.0211 -0.0171**
(job amenities improved) (0.0155) (0.0177) (0.00865)
Scores for factor 3 -0.0312** -0.0288* -0.0204**
(match improved) (0.0158) (0.0171) (0.00940)
Scores for factor 4 -0.0262* -0.0194 -0.0102
(commuting) (0.0149) (0.0165) (0.00900)
Scores for factor 5 0.00930 0.0141 0.0113
(match worsened) (0.0152) (0.0170) (0.00782)
Scores for factor 6 0.0491*** 0.0470*** 0.0444***
(job amenities worsened) (0.0142) (0.0165) (0.00767)
Homeowner 0.0529 0.0292 0.0101
(0.0329) (0.0359) (0.0210)
Number of previous individual mobility -0.00139 0.0159 0.00300
(0.0167) (0.0188) (0.00944)
Age 0.0324** 0.00664 0.00728
(0.0153) (0.0165) (0.00862)
Age2 -0.000330 -1.98e-06 -6.83e-05
(0.000202) (0.000218) (0.000114)
Education in years -0.0189*** -0.0120 -0.00659
(0.00668) (0.00729) (0.00423)
Bluecollar to whitecollar transition 0.00723 -0.0184 0.0247
(0.0646) (0.0707) (0.0410)
Male -0.00160 -0.0222 -0.00871
(0.0338) (0.0376) (0.0193)
Partner 0.00698 -0.00187 0.0185
(0.0394) (0.0430) (0.0257)
Firm more than 2,000 workers 0.0393 0.0498 -0.0136
(0.0439) (0.0468) (0.0241)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers -0.0256 -0.0104 0.0531
(0.0456) (0.0513) (0.0344)
Regional mobility -0.0688 -0.123* -0.0154
(0.0638) (0.0694) (0.0361)
Growth in unemployment rate 0.0188 0.00325 -0.00238
(0.0189) (0.0214) (0.0117)
Number of observations 800
Pseudo R2 0.0635 0.0378 0.1270
Predicted Pr(y = 1 |x¯) 0.2288 0.3116 0.0725
Marginal effects at x¯ are presented.
Specifications (1) and (3) are satisfactory because yˆ2 is insignificant in the link test equa-
tions. The link test associates a p-value of 0.052 to the coefficient of yˆ2 in specification (2).
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the coefficients for this particular factor score are estimated to be negative,
which suggests that a worker who changes to a new job with better amenities
compared to the previous one is less likely to accept wage cuts. As the
probit model does not tell us something about the magnitude of a possible
voluntary earnings loss, I conducted OLS estimation. Similar to the probit
approaches, different dependent variables are applied in order to quantify
the willingness to pay for an increase in amenities. Specifications (1) and
(2) in Table 5 refer to the relative wage change, whereas specifications
(3) and (4) correspond to the real relative wage change. Specifications
(5) to (8) describe the absolute (real) wage change in Euros. None of the
comparison variables of main interest (strain, work time, job security, and
chances for promotion) are significant for the change in relative wages. Also
the match indicator is imprecisely measured. The results obtained in the
probit approaches above are not obviously supported because individuals
do not significantly pay for an improvement in strain by significantly lower
wages. The corresponding coefficients, however, are in line with lower wages
if individuals change to jobs with better workload when compared to the
previous job. Precisely, workers pay for better strain by an average of 1.65 to
1.71%. The estimated coefficients for the individual evaluation of the future
career prospects also confirms the effects of the probit estimates. Although
the average willingness to pay for an improvement in future prospects is
of low economic interest, the negative effect of a worsening in promotion
opportunities is quite sizable. More specifically, worse career prospects
reduce the wage by more than 6.71% when compared to the previous one.
Interpretation of the effects of an improvement in perceived job security are
hardly to justify because the coefficients are not robust across specifications
(1) and (2) as well as (3) and (4). Compensating wage differentials might be
indicated by the positive sign of the coefficients for a worsening in security
against a job loss and a worsening in work time because of the positive
coefficients. In other words, workers are compensated for disamenities such
as less job security and less flexible work schedules by higher wages. Note,
however, that both effects are imprecisely measured by consideration of the
corresponding standard errors.
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Table 5 also refers to the absolute wage change of voluntarily mobile
individuals in Euros (see specifications (5) to (8)). As in specifications (1) to
(4), statistically insignificant effects are obtained for strain, security against
a job loss, and the chances for promotion. The effect of an improvement
in work schedules, however, is non robust by consideration of relative and
absolute wage changes because the results for the absolute wage change and
relative wage change of voluntarily mobile individuals contradict each other.
Precisely, specifications (1) to (4) indicate that workers pay for better work
time regulations while an average wage markup is obtained when referring
to specifications (5) to (8). Another difference is that the match indicator
reveals significant coefficients for the absolute wage change while being
statistically insignificant in explaining the relative wage change. Note that,
however, the effect is robust because improvements as well as worsenings
of the match have a positive effect throughout all specifications in Table
5. The positive coefficient for an improvement in the match quality can be
explained by economic theory, where an improvement in the match quality
leads to an increase in wages. The positive effect of a worsening, in turn,
is hardly to explain. It might be hypothesized that workers might change
from a multi-task job to a highly specialized job where they perceive less
use of their skills. Specialists, however, are to the largest extent paid for
application of specific knowledge although specialists could also make use
of a several different skills. The control variables in Table 5 reveal that
homeowners are more likely to change to lower wages compared to renters.
Precisely, homeowners, ceteris paribus, accept an average wage cut of at
least 3.83% or a minimum of 58 Cents when compared to renters. The
growth in unemployment does not significantly affect the wage change.
It might be argued that outliers affect the results presented in Table
5. For this reason, I excluded wage changes above the 90% percentile and
below the 10% percentile. The exact values for the cutoff of the relative
wage change are shown in Table 1.15 The results for the trimmed sample
are presented in Table 6, whereas it is to note that the specifications differ
15Descriptive statistics for the (real) absolute wage change are presented in this footnote.
On average, workers gain about 1.41 to 1.54 Euros when changing jobs voluntarily.
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in the number of individuals. An interesting finding, which is robust across
Tables 5 and 6 is that workers seem to be compensated for a worsening
in perceived job security. In other words, workers get a wage markup in
exchange for lower security against a job loss. This effect is robust but,
however, it is statistically insignificant in most of the specifications. I also
found that better application of individual skills in the current job compared
to the previous one increases wages significantly. Workers changing to jobs
with better promotion opportunities in the current job compared to the
last one are suggested to earn, on average, (insignificantly) higher wages,
whereas workers who change to jobs with fewer career prospects, in turn,
suffer sizable wage cuts. A possible interpretation is that mobile individuals
who accept fewer future career prospects in the new job are double losers
who suffer not only lower wages but also fewer career prospects in the new
job compared to the last one. Trade-off reasoning between strain and wages
is shown to be non-robust in Table 7.
Table 7 presents the OLS results wherein the factor scores instead
of dummy variables for subjective worsenings and improvements in job
characteristics are considered. As expected, an improvement in the match
quality increases wages, and this effect is not statistically significant in all
of the specifications. The marginal effect of the factor score of commuting
is highly significant in specifications (1) to (4) but statistically as well as
economically insignificant in the remaining specifications. As discussed
above, improvements in commuting lead to a reduction of the corresponding
factor score. For this reason, better commuting decreases wages, whereas
subjectively more commuting expenditures are compensated for by higher
wages. Table 4 suggests that less job amenities are more likely to be
Descriptive statistics for absolute wage change
Variable 10% Percentile Mean 90% Percentile Observations
wijt−wi,j−1,t−1 -1.7827 1.5411 5.4003 800
(4.5613)
wrealijt −wreali,j−1,t−1 -2.2389 1.4123 5.5858 800
(4.8488)
Standard deviations in parentheses
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accompanied by wage cuts. This pattern is generally confirmed in Table 7
where the corresponding coefficient is negative but, however, it tends to be
of small economic importance.
The OLS estimation results can be compared to ones obtained in Vil-
lanueva (2007) although the studies differ in some aspects. The most
important differences between both studies are application of a different
time horizon, consideration of a somewhat different set of regressors, and
finally utilization of different wage definitions. More specifically, Villanueva
(2007) applies net wages instead of gross wages and examines the time period
from 1984 to 2001. The results, however, can be compared with each other
because of the concentration on the effects of the same subjective comparison
variables between jobs on the wage change of voluntary mobility in Germany.
Similar to Villanueva (2007), this paper finds few evidence for compensating
wage differentials because most effects are statistically insignificant. Also
the negative impact reasoning of an improvement in strain is confirmed in
this study although this coefficient is partly insignificant. For this reason,
both studies suggest that trade-off reasoning between workload and wages
is evident.
Further robustness checks are summarized in Table A4 in the appendix.
The table presents OLS estimation results for different subsamples, taking
into consideration the variables strain, work time, security against job
loss, promotion chances, and the match indicator. The robustness checks
divide the sample by gender, homeowners and renters, by age (below and
above median age), and by different phases of the business cycle (growth
of unemployment smaller or larger than zero). One major finding is that
males seem to pay for improvements in strain by higher relative wage losses
when compared to females. When turning the focus on absolute wage
changes, females are shown to accept larger wage cuts for better workload.
Opposed effects are shown for improvements in work schedules. More
flexible work time, on average, increases wages for males while females
trade off improvements in work schedules and wages. The positive effect of
subjectively improved match quality remains highly robust for both genders,
whereas the effect is, to the largest extent, imprecisely measured. For males,
the coefficients for worse matches are non-robust across specifications. Note
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that worse career prospects in the new job compared to the previous one
enforce larger wage cuts in Euros for males than for females. Investigation
of the relative wage change reveals the opposite because, on average, females
pay for worse career prospects more than males. The dummy variable for
homeowners in Table 5 suggests that homeowners are significantly worse
off when compared to renters with identical characteristics. Distinction
between homeowners and renters reveals that better workload is traded
off by renters. For homeowners, the estimated coefficient of this particular
measure is reverse. Precisely, homeowners are able to obtain (insignificant)
wage markups for improvements in strain. When considering workers who
are younger than the median age (younger than 34 years), improvements
in strain are paid for by wage cuts. Older workers, in turn, are shown to
be almost unaffected for better workload. An interesting result is that the
coefficient for less job security in the sample of young workers is positive
(and economically as well as statistically significant) while it is negative
for older workers. Therefore, for workers below the median age, Table A4
indicates an especially pronounced compensating wage differential for low
job security. During booms (∆u≤ 0), the effect of a subjective worsening of
promotion opportunities in the current job compared with the previous one
is economically as well as statistically significant. A possible interpretation
of the negative coefficient might be that mobility to worse future career
prospects during booms signals low own career ambitions, where employers
impose a penalty for this type of signal. During recessions, voluntarily mobile
workers who are able to improve the match quality achieve considerable
wage markups.
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Finally, I conducted tobit (corner solution) estimation in order to explain
the willingness to pay for improvements in job-specific amenities, given the
probability that the individual changes to lower wages. As a consequence,
interpretation of the marginal effects in Table 8 is based on the condition
that workers voluntarily changed to lower wages. The table reveals that
workers significantly pay for improvements in strain. The corresponding
marginal effects suggest that workers with wage cuts pay for better workload
by an average of about 1.2% or 30 to 36 Cent, respectively. For worse strain,
a statistically insignificant as well as economically small moderating effect on
the wage cut is estimated. As above, the tobit model confirms positive effects
for both indicators of the match quality. This implies that subjectively
better or worse matches do not reduce wages when changing jobs. The
effects of promotion opportunities are also robust to the results in the OLS
regressions. Better promotion opportunities mitigate wage cuts while worse
career prospects in the new job compared to the previous one increase wage
cuts. It is also confirmed that workers seem to pay for less commuting
expenses by earnings losses whereas the effect is comparable to the one of
better workload. Inconsistencies can be found for the effects of subjective
perceptions about job security.
Table 9 presents the results for the tobit model when considering the
factor scores. Workers changing to lower wages, on average, pay for less
commuting expenses by lower wages. The factor score, however, reveals
an economically small effect because, on average, less than 0.55% or an
average maximum of 15 Cent are paid for the improvement in commuting.
This effect is considerably smaller compared to the one presented in Table 7
but reveals robustness of this particular coefficient. A further similarity to
the results in the OLS regressions is the moderating effect on wage cuts if
the match quality in the current job is better than in the previous job. A
worsening in job amenities is paid for by lower wages. This result is highly
robust when compared to Table 7. Albeit highly statistically significant,
the effect is of small economic significance. It might be argued that workers
changing to worse job amenities are changing to some sort of low-pay sector
with dead-end jobs, low job stability (or low job security), and low (or
inexistent) fringe benefits. This result is also consistent with the ”segmented
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Table 9 : Tobit regression results for wage cut, given that individuals change to lower wages (factor scores)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables wijt
wi,j−1,t−1
wrealijt
wreal
i,j−1,t−1
wijt−wi,j−1,t−1 wrealijt −wreali,j−1,t−1
Scores for factor 1 0.00352 0.00297 0.0575 0.0478
(working conditions) (0.00242) (0.00225) (0.0569) (0.0555)
Scores for factor 2 4.03e-05 0.000575 0.0272 0.0446
(job amenities improved) (0.00249) (0.00237) (0.0592) (0.0589)
Scores for factor 3 0.00512* 0.00425* 0.151** 0.132*
(match improved) (0.00267) (0.00238) (0.0752) (0.0690)
Scores for factor 4 0.00533** 0.00402* 0.121* 0.0905
(commuting) (0.00251) (0.00230) (0.0716) (0.0668)
Scores for factor 5 -0.000386 -0.000560 -0.0128 -0.0138
(match worsened) (0.00236) (0.00217) (0.0540) (0.0514)
Scores for factor 6 -0.00662*** -0.00551*** -0.129** -0.102**
(job amenities worsened) (0.00215) (0.00206) (0.0507) (0.0509)
Homeowner -0.00843 -0.00536 -0.292* -0.222
(0.00545) (0.00500) (0.158) (0.147)
Number of previous individual mobility -0.00139 -0.00261 -0.0248 -0.0629
(0.00286) (0.00267) (0.0714) (0.0682)
Age -0.00418 -0.00113 -0.115* -0.0386
(0.00260) (0.00228) (0.0589) (0.0516)
Age2 3.82e-05 1.41e-06 0.00110 0.000176
(3.48e-05) (3.07e-05) (0.000767) (0.000693)
Education in years 0.00357*** 0.00245** 0.0606** 0.0350
(0.00115) (0.00102) (0.0280) (0.0262)
Blue-collar to white-collar transition -0.00414 -0.00234 -0.0135 0.0505
(0.0117) (0.0111) (0.251) (0.243)
Male -0.000965 0.00102 -0.0698 -0.0236
(0.00538) (0.00487) (0.133) (0.125)
Partner 0.000133 0.00122 0.00757 0.0351
(0.00643) (0.00572) (0.154) (0.143)
Firm more than 2,000 workers -0.00473 -0.00490 -0.179 -0.196
(0.00746) (0.00674) (0.234) (0.228)
Previous firm more than 2,000 workers -0.00263 -0.00428 -0.140 -0.205
(0.00891) (0.00802) (0.261) (0.253)
Regional mobility -0.00215 0.00176 0.0255 0.138
(0.0157) (0.0148) (0.359) (0.350)
Growth in unemployment rate -0.00320 -0.00127 -0.0705 -0.0260
(0.00319) (0.00283) (0.0771) (0.0710)
Number of observations 800
Uncensored observations 195 254 195 254
Censored observations 605 546 605 546
Pseudo R2 0.1071 0.0939 0.0270 0.0169
Log-likelihood -229.8 -208.5 -852.7 -1037.3
Marginal effects after tobit regression.
Robust standard errors clustered for 670 individuals in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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labor market” in Villanueva (2007), where wage penalties are attached to
job-specific disamenities.
To sum up, trade-off reasoning, as hypothesized above, is a key feature
of the acceptance of wage cuts. The results show that subjectively better
workload is paid for by lower wages. I am, however, not able to find distinct
support for the hypothesis that workers trade off improvements in work
time arrangements, better security against job loss, and the acceptance
of lower wages. There is weak (mostly statistically insignificant) evidence
in favor of compensating wage differentials for worse strain and for less
security against a job loss. In addition, the hypothesis that workers pay
for better career prospects by wage cuts cannot be supported in this paper.
In fact, the reverse is suggested because better promotion opportunities
are accompanied by higher wages. For worse promotion opportunities,
individuals are not compensated for by higher wages. The findings on some
of the job-specific amenities differ when considering subjective perceptions
about worsenings in wages instead of using objective measures for wage
cuts. This might be driven by cognitive dissonance reduction where workers
adjust their perceptions about the job in a positive way to resolve cognitive
dissonance introduced by mobility to lower wages.
5 Discussion
This paper investigates the relationship between subjective improvements
between two jobs and voluntary mobility to lower wages. This allows to
assess the impact of trade-off reasoning on individual labor market decisions.
The results suggest that job-specific (non-wage) amenities affect the job
choice. More specifically, workers are shown to voluntarily accept wage cuts
when improvements in strain can be achieved. The loss of utility through
decreasing wages is, thus, compensated for by an increase in utility through
improvements in job-specific amenities in the new job. Besides, the paper
reveals evidence in favor of compensating wage differentials for less security
against job loss.
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The results also have important implications for employers. Offering
non-wage amenities can attract workers of competitors who pay higher
wages. This implies that those employers who offer, for example, activities to
decrease job-specific strain are suggested to attract employees of competitors
despite lower wages. Since Schneck (2010) showed that transitions to
permanently lower wages are common, it might be hypothesized that workers
trade off permanent lower wages with subjective improvements in certain
job-specific characteristics. This study shows that less strain is a potential
candidate for the acceptance of downward mobility.
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Appendix
Table A1 : Frequencies of subjective comparisons between old and new job
How would you judge your present position compared to your last one?
In what ways has it improved, stayed the same, or worsened
Variable improved stayed the
same
worsened
Length of commute to and from work 280 274 246
Work load (strain) 269 367 164
Work schedule regulations (work
time)
349 324 127
Security against job loss 276 471 53
Chances for promotion 348 402 50
General Job type 461 306 33
Fringe benefits 280 428 92
Wages 521 203 76
Are you able to use your professional skills and abilities today more,
about the same, or less than in your previous position?
more about the
same
less
(improved) (stayed the
same)
(worsened)
Use of skills 328 370 102
Number of observations 800
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Table A2 : Descriptive statistics of the control variables
Mean Standard Deviation
Subjective improvement in
Work load (strain) 0.3363 0.4727
Work schedule regulations (work time) 0.4363 0.4962
Security against job loss 0.3450 0.4757
Use of skills 0.4100 0.4921
Commuting 0.3500 0.4773
Chances for promotion 0.4350 0.4961
Fringe benefits 0.3500 0.4773
Job type 0.5763 0.4945
Subjective worsening in
Work load (strain) 0.2050 0.4040
Work schedule regulations (work time) 0.1588 0.3657
Security against job loss 0.0663 0.2489
Use of skills 0.1275 0.3337
Commuting 0.3075 0.4617
Chances for promotion 0.0625 0.2422
Fringe benefits 0.1150 0.3192
Job type 0.0413 0.1990
Dummy variable for homeowners 0.3063 0.4612
Number of individual quits 1.7500 0.8992
Age 35.0725 7.9551
Age2 1293.2850 593.8163
Education (in years of schooling) 12.7719 2.5192
Dummy variable for blue-collar to white-collar 0.0575 0.2329
Dummy variable for males 0.6475 0.4780
Dummy variable for partner 0.2125 0.4093
Dummy variable for workforceijt>2,000 0.1713 0.3770
Dummy variable for workforcei,j−1,t−1>2,000 0.1325 0.3392
Dummy variable for regional mobility 0.0475 0.2128
Growth in unemployment rate -0.0571 0.7854
Number of observations 800
Number of individuals 670
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Table A3 (continued): Spearman’s correlation and Tetrachoric correlations
for binary variables
fringe
benefits job type wage
↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
fringe benefits ↑ 1.000
benefits ↑
fringe -0.265* 1.000
benefits ↓ -1.000*
job type ↑ 0.078* 0.016 1.000
0.127* 0.033
job type ↓ 0.032 0.043 -0.242* 1.000
0.091 0.140 -1.000*
wage ↑ 0.130* -0.123* 0.121* -0.033 1.000
0.218* -0.246* 0.194* -0.093
wage ↓ -0.086* 0.191* -0.067 0.061 -0.443* 1.000
-0.203* 0.405* -0.145 0.195 -1.000*
Number of observations: 800
Spearman’s correlation and Tetrachoric correlations for binary variables (below).
↑ describes improvements, ↓ refers to subjective worsenings.
* p<0.05
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